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Abstract 
Recent attempts to recalibrate the U.S-India relationship require a clearer understanding of how 
this relationship began. To that end, this essay traces the themes characterizing early U.S.-India 
relations through a rhetorical analysis of Time magazine cover portraits and articles from 1951 to 
1962 featuring the first Prime Minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru. Acting as an 
index of the U.S. administration and partly conveying the attitudes of its editor-in-chief toward 
India, Time advanced a set of arguments about India’s unreliability as a Cold War ally and the 
essential correctness of the U.S. administration’s stance against Communist nations and those 
who eschewed open alignment with U.S. during the Cold War. Time’s coverage formed a 
narrative arc that admonished India’s attempts at friendship with China and Cold War neutrality 
while vindicating the U.S. cause during this period. I conclude that Cold War themes linger in 
U.S. news reporting on India, argue for more scholarship on non-Western nations, and suggest 
that, along with verbal texts, images are rich sources of foreign policy rhetoric. 
Keywords: foreign policy, news, India, China, Cold War, images, narrative 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Western Journal of 
Communication on 06 Sep 2013, available online: 
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It’s About Time:  Reading U.S.-India Cold War Perceptions Through News Coverage of India 
In November 2009, the Obama administration held its first and largest state dinner for a 
foreign visitor: Dr Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India. BBC News reported that President 
Obama called India and the United States “two global leaders driven not to dominate other 
nations, but to build a future of security and prosperity for all nations,” a future in which “India 
is indispensable” (“Barack Obama”). White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs saw the event 
as “a show of respect for the value that we put on [the U.S.-India] relationship” (“Barack 
Obama”). These sentiments were reiterated in the President’s November 2010 trip to India when 
he described the U.S.-India relationship as “one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century” 
(“Remarks, 8 December 2010”). 
Nor has this Indian turn been limited to the U.S. government. In September 2011 the New 
York Times launched its first-ever country-specific site: “India Ink,” a blog by journalists from 
the paper and writers from India seeking to produce “unbiased, authoritative reporting on the 
country and its place in the world.” The Economist released a special report on India in 
September 2012 followed by an online debate on India’s economy in October 2012. Mirroring 
Obama’s 2010 statements, The Economist noted in June 2012 that America and India sought to 
“define a new sort of relationship” that recognized India as crucial to the U.S.’s “rebalancing 
strategy” against China and to Afghanistan’s stability after NATO leaves in 2014 (“India and 
America”).  
The upturn in news coverage of India reflects the U.S. government’s efforts to recalibrate 
a relationship that began rather unhappily when the U.S. pressured Britain unsuccessfully to 
grant India independence in World War II, only to find India unwilling to support the U.S. in the 
ensuing Cold War. Instead, India led a nonaligned bloc that seemed to support the U.S.’s major 
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rivals, the Soviet Union and China. Relations were complicated further by India’s nuclear 
program and U.S military support for India’s nemesis, Pakistan. Even after over more than 60 
years of bilateral relations and a significant influx in Indian immigration, the U.S. remains 
unsure about how to picture, and hence, how to engage, emerging nations like India. President 
Clinton expressed this uncertainty in a series of antithetical descriptions before India’s 
Parliament in 2000: “From a distance, India often appears as a kaleidoscope of competing, 
perhaps superficial, images. Is it atomic weapons, or ahimsa1? Is it the handloom or the 
hyperlink?”(Clinton, “Remarks by the President”). Hence, India’s conceptualization and its place 
in the American imaginary remain a perennial theme in U.S. foreign policy.  
One way to get at the roots of this complex relationship is to shift focus to the initial 
decades of bilateral relations captured in the U.S. media’s coverage of India. To that end, this 
essay investigates early U.S.-India relations between 1951 and 1962 through a rhetorical 
examination of three Time issues featuring Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India. I 
find that the cover images and their corresponding articles presented American readers with a 
perception of India that reflected the Cold War attitudes of the U.S. administration (and partly 
that of Time’s then editor-in-chief) during this period. Specifically, my analysis reveals how 
Time traced the demise of India’s naïve attempts at Cold War neutrality and friendship with 
Communist China, while vindicating the U.S. government’s opposition to both efforts.  
This case study of Time’s strategies of representation offers several contributions to 
rhetorical scholarship. First, I expand rhetorical literature on India and, in doing so, answer calls 
to “internationalize public address studies” (Zarefsky 76) and broaden communication 
scholarship to reach beyond Western nations. India’s growing value as a U.S. ally and global 
actor makes a study of the roots of the U.S.-India relationship especially pertinent. This is 
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particularly so given that much ink has been devoted to studying media treatment of the primary 
U.S. Cold War antagonists, China and the Soviet Union, while India’s interestingly problematic 
status as a neutral party remains overlooked. In providing this missing piece, this essay also 
expands the slim corpus on India, a country which provides rich scope for rhetorical study, but 
which has thus far been studied only in limited ways, focusing heavily on Mahatma Gandhi’s 
social movement rhetoric.2 I add a rhetorical perspective on Nehru, who has been studied much 
less, despite being the U.S.’s prime point of political contact with India for over twenty years.  
Second, because Time crafted its portrayal of India in words and images, this study shows 
how visual elements can supplement rhetorical examinations of foreign relations. An image is a 
helpful resource for portraying attitudes because it uses a universal language of gestures and 
symbols to construct visual arguments about its subject. Birdsell and Groarke have explained that 
an image’s strategy of argumentation draws on contexts provided by other images and 
accompanying texts, as well as a society’s prevailing visual culture, to advance particular 
viewpoints (6). A visual culture as used here refers to the prevalent codes and “way[s] of seeing” 
(Hariman and Lucaites 298) with which readers interpret images enthymematically (Pineda and 
Sowards 166). For example, a red star during the Cold War was code for ‘communism,’ while a 
fiery dragon denoted ‘China,’3 just as knotted brows have always signaled a person deep in 
thought, and a bowed head spells defeat. In drawing on shared interpretations of visual codes, 
images can reveal attitudes and thus provide useful insight into portrayals of other nations. 
Third, this essay extends work on visual rhetoric by highlighting the role of images in 
depicting relations between rather than within countries. Thus far, scholars have looked at 
identity-formation within national boundaries, covering such questions as the power of images to 
provoke deliberation about citizenship and perceptions of national public figures. In their 
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discussion of the constitution of civic identity through iconic photographs, Hariman and Lucaites 
argued that citizens must be able to discuss “whether their … habits for viewing the world are 
helping them to sustain themselves as a public” (298). Similarly, Lubin’s work on the image 
culture of the Kennedy presidency, Brown’s examination of pictorial reporting in gilded age 
America and Erickson’s study of presidential styles as visual performance fragments 
underscored the importance of visual elements in publics’ perceptions of their nation. I add to 
this work by looking beyond images of the U.S. to images of other nations.4  
The essay proceeds as follows: First, I outline early U.S-India Cold War relations. Next, I 
discuss images of India in U.S. popular culture in the 1940s-60s, highlighting Time’s role in the 
production and dissemination of arguments about India. The examination of Time is followed by 
an analysis of Time’s Nehru covers and articles, in which I uncover a narrative arc tracing the 
demise of India’s neutrality policy during the Cold War. I conclude by discussing the 
implications of this narrative and the value of images in rhetorical studies of foreign relations.  
U.S.-India Cold War Relations 
In 1947, India emerged from a century and a half of British rule. After a protracted war 
for self-determination in which India had been forced to contribute troops to Britain’s World 
War II effort and had parted violently from Pakistan, the battle-weary nation found herself in the 
middle of the Cold War. Years of colonization made India’s leaders adamant that the new nation 
avoid the entanglements of other countries’ foreign policies. Nehru’s autobiography revealed that 
even before India’s independence, he dreaded a “new kind of imperialism” by the “powerfully 
expansionist” post-war American economy (558). Consequently, India sought to remain free of 
the webs of other countries’ interests by adopting a policy of neutrality and “a prevailing 
conceptualization of non-alignment in global factions” (Kuracina 531).  
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Although India saw nonalignment as an indication of a “desire to live in peace and 
friendship” with others (Zaidi 450), her espousal of neutrality perplexed the U.S., who saw the 
Cold War as an ideological battle in the middle of which there could only be equivocation. By 
not aligning with the non-communist U.S., India indicated de facto support for the communist 
Soviet Union and China. Nehru’s belief in what his biographer Sarvepalli Gopal called the 
“containment of China through friendship” and his repeated efforts to win Mao Tse-Tung’s 
confidence often turned neutrality into alignment (Gopal quoted in Chaudhry and Vanduzer-
Snow 41). Even as Beijing’s repeated border incursions into India made it difficult to defend 
China, Nehru remained “reluctant to characterize Communist China as other than a peaceful 
nation whose intentions had been misjudged by the West” (282). Intentional or not, India’s 
neutrality to the U.S. in effect became neutrality against it, with then-Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles calling the policy not only mistaken or unfortunate, but “immoral” (Isaacs xxvii).  
The perceived immorality of Communism and the corresponding righteousness of the 
U.S. cause constituted the primary frame through which the U.S. viewed nations during the Cold 
War. Gerbner observed that “the image of Russia throughout the 1970s and 1980s [was] largely 
frozen into a frigid Cold War formula” (33), while Chang’s work on U.S. media representations 
of China between the 1950s and the 1980s revealed a similar attitude.5 In a famous illustration of 
the Cold War narrative espoused by the U.S. government and reproduced in news coverage, 
Entman (1991) argued that the U.S. media used contrasting frames to depict the U.S. downing of 
an Iranian plane in 1988 and the Soviet downing of a Korean jet in 1983 such that the Soviet 
action was depicted as an act of moral bankruptcy while the U.S. action was attributed to 
understandable human error. Thus, Cold War attitudes prevalent during the formative years of 
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U.S.-India engagement cast the U.S. in a favorable light while criticizing Communist nations and 
sympathizers such as India. 
India’s nonalignment caused particular anxiety because it revealed that the U.S. could not 
assume allegiance from a country with historical similarities and shared political values. As a 
fellow secular democracy and former British colony, India’s support in the ideological tussle 
between communism and democracy had seemed inevitable. It is possible that the U.S. also saw 
in India’s push for freedom elements of her own revolution against Britain in the 18th century 
and expected India to feel a similar kinship. Thus, as Robert McMahon explained, “most 
administration planners were convinced that India’s eventual alignment with the West remained 
a logical expectation” (45). Naturally, suspicion and frustration arose when this hoped-for 
alignment did not manifest. 6 A 1955 New York Times editorial cartoon aptly captured the U.S. 
befuddlement when it depicted Nehru sitting atop a rope curling upward to spell “neutrality” 
with a puzzled world looking on (Isaacs 247). 
The U.S. Media’s Representation of India 
In fact, the news and entertainment media were the primary lenses through which 
Americans encountered India in this period because Indian immigration to the U.S. and 
governmental engagement was minimal until the 1950s.7 This is not to say that India was absent 
from the U.S. popular consciousness. Rather, the American public had some, albeit limited, 
knowledge of India through books such as Katherine Mayo’s 1927 sordid account of Indian 
poverty in Mother India,8 Life photographer Margaret Bourke-White’s 1949 Halfway to 
Freedom, in which she spent two years chronicling India in photographs and First Lady Eleanor 
Roosevelt’s 1953 survey of Asia in India and the Awakening East. These works varied in scope, 
tone, and purpose, but all presented a country that bewildered readers with its dual identity as a 
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secular democracy with deeply religious customs, its public worship of female deities alongside 
systematic gender discrimination against women and its juxtaposition of immense wealth with 
abject poverty. Thus, early constructions of India in the American popular imagination depicted 
it as a nation of conflicting identities and priorities.  
Films such as The Charge of the Light Brigade (1936), The Drum (1938), and The Bengal 
Brigade (1954) presented American audiences with an additional sense of India not just as a 
country of confusing dualities, but one with a dangerous capacity for deceit. The films, which 
featured well-known actors such as Errol Flynn, Olivia de Havilland, and Rock Hudson, were 
replete with plotlines of Indian soldiers who rebelled against commanding officers, attacked 
British barracks, and committed fratricide and regicide. Hence, the image of India in U.S. 
popular literature and films was of a country difficult to fathom, encompassing numerous 
paradoxes, and possessing an unnerving potential for violent betrayal.  
This image exemplified colonial discourses which characterized colonies by “qualities 
assigned to the individual savage – dishonesty, suspicion, superstition, lack of self-discipline” 
(Spurr 76). Such discourses used “the rhetorical debasement of the cultural Other” (Spurr 76) to 
fulfill what Hayden White called “the need for positive self-definition” that emerged “in times of 
sociocultural stress” (151) posed by an unknown and seemingly irrational set of foreign actors 
(such as wily, paradoxical and violent Indians). Thus, while Time’s themes of U.S. vindication 
and Indian naiveté resulted partly from the Cold War binary, they also echoed earlier colonial 
narratives that celebrated the righteousness of the West by denigrating those who were different.9 
Few U.S. news sources made India as visually present as Time and to as wide an 
audience. Time was a popular national magazine whose weekly circulation soared from 641,000 
copies in 1936 to 750,000 in 1940 (Herzstein 30) until it reached more than one million 
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American readers during World War II (50). As the only Time Inc. publication dedicated to 
politics and global affairs, Time was a staple reading resource during World War II and the Cold 
War, prompting William F. Buckley, Jr. to declare that “if it was in Time, it was important” 
(Herzstein xii). Time was also especially attentive to India. In addition to six covers of Nehru 
between 1942 and 1962, Time featured Mahatma Gandhi in 1930, 1931 and 1947. In contrast, 
partner magazine Life did not feature India or any of its leadership until its coverage of Nehru’s 
funeral in 1964.10 Time claimed special expertise as an authority on India and prefaced its 1959 
and 1962 cover stories with letters from the publisher attesting to the veracity of the articles and 
their writers’ deep knowledge of India.11  
The literature on media indexing and Time’s organizational structure suggest that Time’s 
coverage was informed partly by official U.S. foreign policy and partly by Time’s editor-in-chief, 
Henry Luce. In a seminal essay, Bennett argued that news organizations “‘index’ the range of 
voices and viewpoints …according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government 
debate” (106). In short, the media tend to align their reporting to the interpretive frames provided 
by official government sources.12 The tendency to index official policy is even greater, argued 
Gans, in coverage of foreign relations, where information about distant countries is harder to 
come by, such that American news media hew closer to the State Department on foreign issues 
than to the White House on domestic news (37).  
The media’s adoption of the administration’s lead in foreign policy has been borne out in 
numerous studies. Chang’s study of the New York Times and Washington Post from 1950 to 
1984 found that variations in these outlets’ coverage of China followed the changing agenda and 
attitudes of the U.S. government. Similarly, Perlmutter found that “the political stance of the US 
government…was the consistent determinant of the connotative intent of the images” of China in 
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the New York Times, Newsweek, and Time from 1949 to 1989 (Photojournalism 7).  As Bernard 
Cohen once concluded, “the news media serve as a continuous and articulate link between 
foreign policy officials in the government and those people on the outside who follow events” 
(194).  
Henry Luce also played a role in shaping Time’s coverage of India because he not only 
possessed a strong set of views on India but was an unusually interventionist editor-in-chief. His 
stringent supervision of Time’s stories, including occasionally co-writing editorials, 
distinguished Time’s reporting structure from that of other publications (Gans 96) and stamped 
the magazine with Luce’s views on India. His strongly pro-U.S., anti-communist stance made 
India and Nehru special “subjects of [Time’s] opprobrium for appeasing the People’s Republic of 
China and making self-righteous criticisms of U.S. anti-Communist policy” (Perlmutter, 
Picturing China 130).13  Therefore, Time was an important indicator, first, of the U.S. 
government’s views, and second, of the forceful Time-Life editor-in-chief’s stance on India.  
A final reason to study Time is that it was famous for its iconic cover portraiture. Time’s 
trademark single-person cover portraits were key to the magazine’s construction of other 
countries in the minds of its readers. Even with the advent of mass reproduction of photographs 
in news magazines, Time reserved portraits for notable figures. Portraits gave Time’s artists and 
editors flexibility in depicting their subjects, especially because earlier portraits, such as those of 
Nehru, did not have sitters who could insist on being painted a certain way. Thus, portraits 
accorded Time the leeway to shape the images readers encountered and that the magazine wished 
them to associate with India via Nehru.   
The tone of news coverage of India depended on whether U.S. administrations took a 
shine to Nehru – most did not. In the main, Nehru was recognized as an astute intellectual and 
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politician, but his frequent comments on the “narrower, more dogmatic Western mind” meant he 
was by no means loved in America (Krenn 103).  To complicate matters, there was rarely a 
unified stance toward Nehru. Although his “tone of moral superiority in political affairs … 
infuriated Americans…and became the single most strongly negative factor in U.S.-Indian 
relations from the U.S. point of view,” he was also regarded by liberals as “as the finest example 
of humane leadership in Asia” (103, 104) Thus, while Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
found Nehru an “utterly impractical statesman” (Chaudhry and Vanduzer-Snow 28), his 
predecessor Dean Acheson felt that “Nehru was so important to India and India’s survival, so 
important to all of us that if he did not exist –as Voltaire said of God—he would have to be 
invented” (336). 
U.S. administrations’ conflicting views of Nehru heightened the uncertainty infusing his 
interpretation. While in prison, he wrote frankly about his political principles, often pre-empting 
the misgivings felt about him.14 As Harold Isaacs explained, “these attributes of the Nehru image 
impose[d] a peculiar discomfort” because Nehru himself identified the very failings for which he 
was criticized, thus asserting power over his observers (305). Hence, “from all these real or 
fancied contradictions [came] much of the defensive uneasiness of his friends and acute irritation 
felt by so many of his critics and foes” (305). Nehru’s tendency toward self-reflection, in which 
he was paradoxically both subject and critic, confounded attempts to understand his intentions, 
and by extension, those of his country. 
In portraying this contradictory Cold War actor to U.S. readers, Time produced three 
portraits of Nehru which featured him alongside symbols of Communist China.15 In 1951, he was 
pensive while considering Red China next door. In 1959, he was anxious and straining to 
manage a fast-advancing China, and in 1962, he bowed his head as Mao loomed over him. These 
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covers and their accompanying articles form the core of my analysis because they dealt with the 
central question of how Time presented a justification of U.S. Cold War foreign policy that 
indexed the U.S. administration’s belief in the righteousness of its stance against communism 
and the error of countries that eschewed open alignment with the U.S.. 16 
 
The covers and their articles charted the disintegration of neutrality as Nehru was 
compelled to choose a side in the Cold War. First, Time argued that Nehru was a thinker rather 
than a doer and that his policy of neutrality was rooted in idealistic philosophy instead of 
practical politics. Hence, neutrality was bound to fail because it was the brainchild of a 
misguided and ineffectual philosopher. Second, when this thinker did act, his actions ran counter 
to his espoused philosophy, creating a perception of Nehru (and thus India) as a paradox not to 
be trusted because his words were inconsistent with his deeds. This argument was most 
prominent in discussions of Nehru’s advocacy of neutrality, but apparent support of communist 
nations. Together, these two arguments combined into a broader argument that cast doubt on 
Nehru’s credibility and judgment, particularly in light of his doomed neutrality policy. In this 
third argument, Time suggested that the U.S.’s stance in the Cold War was right, and that Nehru 
had been mistaken in his attempts to befriend Communist China. My analysis finds that these 
three themes—Thinker Nehru, Paradoxical India, and U.S. Vindication— combined to paint a 
narrative in which Indian neutrality was discredited. I now trace these themes across the Time 
issues from 1951, 1959, and 1962.   
Thinker Nehru 
The 1951 cover was painted after China’s 1950 invasion of Tibet, an event that gave 
Nehru cause for anxiety, but which subsided after Beijing agreed to a peaceful settlement. 
Hence, neutrality and the attempt to make China a friend had not backfired – yet. Nevertheless, 
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the cover portrait showed him deep in thought, with his brow furrowed and his wrist poised 
pensively below his chin as he considered the dawning problem of China from the shelter of his 
palace. His fingers were curled into his palm save for one, which reached out to press down on 
his already pursed lips – Nehru was conscious of the Chinese threat in his peripheral gaze but 
would not acknowledge it. Instead, he glanced away from the rising communist sun while 
indulging in what the accompanying article called “wistful fairy tales” of being left alone to chart 
India’s course (“Pandit’s Mind” 34). Taken on its own, the cover presented India as painted into 
a corner by the imminent Chinese threat but still considering the problem from afar, seeking 
refuge in shadowed interiors and gazing away determinedly as though hoping the problem would 
resolve itself. 
The accompanying article extended the argument of Nehru as a passive thinker unwilling 
to commit to definite action. Just as the cover painted Nehru ensconced in his palace, neither 
acknowledging China’s aggression nor remaining completely sanguine, the article recalled an 
incident from India’s colonial era where Nehru perched himself atop a British palisade 
separating Hindu pilgrims from the Ganges River; he protested the British action, but did little 
more for the Indians than sit where he was, literally not coming down on either side. For the 
Time writers, this moment was emblematic of Nehru’s “uncomfortable, prominent and median 
posture” (“Pandit’s Mind” 31). Instead of taking action, Nehru adopted a “legs-astride 
position…on the vast fence that runs through the world” and in doing so, frustrated U.S. 
onlookers who could not understand such ambivalence (“Pandit’s Mind” 31). More to the point, 
they could not understand the kind of mind that would produce such ambivalence. In trying to 
make sense of Nehru’s inscrutable inaction, the article made several references to Nehru’s mind 
and explained that “Americans, on whose affairs and prospects the mind of Jawaharlal Nehru 
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thus has considerable influence, would like to understand that mind” (34). “Sooner or later,” 
proclaimed Time, “[Nehru] must act” and “Nehru’s privileged balancing act cannot go on 
forever” because “it is evident that the world is going either in America’s direction or in 
Russia’s” (34). The fact that this situation was not evident to Nehru only confirmed his image as 
a leader who preferred ponderous thought to decisive action.  
It is additionally illuminating to note how this article was laid out inside the magazine. 
After seeing the cover, interested viewers turning to the follow-up story inside would see a page 
dominated by a cartoon depicting Truman and Stalin as naked swamis (Hindu holy men) sitting 
cross-legged, smoking a hookah. The cartoon’s caption read “Truman and Stalin hold a peace 
conference” (“Conferences” 34). Upon closer reading, viewers would find that the picture 
accompanied a report about a spiritual conference in Delhi which neither Truman nor Stalin 
attended. However, since it extended across two-thirds of the page, was placed among the text of 
the cover article, and depicted two key figures in the Cold War, the cartoon appeared to 
accompany the Nehru cover story. In fact, the text above the cartoon was the opening paragraph 
of the cover story and started with a sentence about Hindu pilgrims (this was the palisade 
incident referred to earlier), so it seemed paired with the Truman-Stalin swami cartoon. When 
viewed with its surrounding text the cartoon satirized India’s neutrality policy by suggesting that 
there was no need to pick sides in the Cold War because everyone could get along if they just sat 
and meditated.  
In 1959, Nehru’s attempts at meditation were interrupted as he was brought into reluctant 
contact with the reality of Communist China – a reality in which China had breached a Sino-
Indian border agreement, killed nine frontier policemen and taken an Indian prisoner in 
retaliation for Nehru offering asylum to the Dalai Lama. Relations in 1959 were hence at an 
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unprecedented low, a state of affairs reflected in Time’s cover that year. Nehru adopted a similar 
pose as in 1951, with his hand brushing against his mouth, this time tugging at his lower lip. He 
had finally turned his head to the communist presence next door, but still avoided direct 
confrontation.    
Nehru’s gestures on the 1951 and 1959 covers echoed the ‘knuckles under the chin’ 
posture of pensive concentration codified in Auguste Rodin’s late nineteenth-century sculpture, 
The Thinker (Boegehold 24). David Lubin called such commonly-understood gestures the 
“visual language” of a society’s inescapable “artistic lineage,” one in which painters and “ancient 
Roman sculptors taught us what facial expression to wear and bodily postures to assume” when 
people wish to dedicate themselves to a certain cause (xi). In Rodin’s case, the thinker’s pose is 
so embedded in viewing culture that it has become shorthand for a person so absorbed in thought 
and in searching for a solution that he is oblivious to the world outside. The departure in Nehru’s 
case was that he was far from oblivious to China’s aggression, but insisted nonetheless on 
waiting and thinking. Nehru’s pose in these covers was lent further resonance by the fact that 
while Gandhi was called “Mahatma” (Great Soul) by his followers, Nehru was christened 
“Pandit” (Great Scholar), emphasizing his persona as a philosopher. The covers thus reflected 
Time’s framing of Nehru as a thinker but without this title’s positive connotations. Instead, Time 
portrayed a negative view of Nehru the thinker –rather than doer— and a frustration with what 
the 1951 cover story called the “Pandit’s Mind” (31). 
The 1959 article extended the theme of Nehru’s inertia to suggest that he was incapable 
of movement, being limited to thinking and speaking without effecting change. The article 
reiterated some points we have encountered before, such as Nehru pausing in the face of clear 
danger. The writers remarked that “[the crisis with China] …was a threat that Nehru typically, 
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first tried not to see, then ignored and then tried to argue away” and described his “hesitant 
response to China’s calculated attack on the Indian patrol” on the border with China (“India: The 
Shade” 23).  When Nehru did take a firm stance against China, the article described this as an 
uncharacteristic moment where “Nehru stunningly and surprisingly emerged from the cocoon of 
indecision” (23).  
Time argued that Nehru did not just act slowly but that when he did act, he was unable to 
bring about real change. The article documented how he “tried, on occasion, to translate into 
action his vague and intensely personal theories about socialism” but failed to interest Indian 
businessman in his theories (“India: The Shade” 22). In various attempts to reform his 
administration, “he railed against the ingrained Indian habits of inefficiency…stormed at the 
prevalence of holidays…pleaded with his colleagues in the governing Congress Party” but all 
that happened was that “they listened and went back to their old ways” (22). Instead of taking 
action and making crucial decisions, he “gives long, rambling extemporaneous talks…full of 
digressions and schoolmasterly asides” (22). Nehru was cast as an ineffectual philosopher whose 
sphere of action was limited to railing, pleading, and schoolmasterly rambling.  
The schoolmaster’s mind was no longer a point of note, let alone contention, by 1962, 
when China added to the violent border incursions of 1959 with multiple attacks along the Sino-
Indian border. Nehru’s ponderous inaction in this last year of coverage, rather than a cause for 
frustration, merely confirmed his weakness as a politician. The 1962 article made a passing 
reference to Nehru “[sitting] chin in hand...his abstracted gaze, fixed on nothing” (“India: Never 
Again” 24) and to how “India moves at a different pace” (28), but it was less concerned with the 
puzzle of Nehru’s mind or his inept actions as were the previous articles. Thus, while “Thinker 
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Nehru” began as a fairly prominent theme, its importance dissipated as Time became more 
familiar with India and perhaps felt it had deciphered Nehru’s mind. 
Paradoxical India 
The second major argument was “Paradoxical India.” This theme described the paradox 
between Nehru’s words and deeds and suggested that this contradiction revealed the hypocrisy of 
neutralism and India’s capacity for deceit. Picking up the threads of “Thinker Nehru,” Time’s 
1951 cover story suggested further that Nehru was not so much a thinker as a pontificator, and in 
this respect, a pale imitation of Gandhi. Where Gandhi was a true moral leader, Nehru’s 
injunctions against the evils of U.S. imperialism and the consequent need for neutrality merely 
aped Gandhi’s principles of peace while hiding a selfish politics of pragmatism.  
The 1951 article argued that “Nehru has indeed tried to speak Gandhi’s language, but he 
has not acted by Gandhi’s faith” (“Pandit’s Mind” 34). Instead of remaining true to its “Gandhi-
like doctrine, Nehru’s government has fought one successful war (against Hyderabad) and 
maintains a large army, poised for fighting, in Kashmir” (33). The point was not so much that 
Nehru, contra-Gandhi, deployed violence, but that “Nehru is all for nonviolence – when it comes 
to governments other than his own” (34). The article complained that Nehru would defend the 
presence of the Indian army in Kashmir by saying that “to talk complacently of peace when 
something worse than war is possible is to be blind to facts,” while denying “the West’s right not 
to be blind to worldwide Communist aggression” (34). Nehru judged his country’s actions by a 
different set of standards than what he applied to other nations, suggesting that he was not the 
principled successor to Gandhi he pretended to be. Time saw inconsistency as a hallmark of 
Nehru, who seemed to take a stance only to reverse it in the next moment.  Having spoken out 
against U.S. imperialism, Nehru was determined to “resist the onslaught of rapacious U.S. 
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business” into India after she gained independence in 1947 (33). When the expected onslaught 
did not materialize, Nehru was “more chagrined than relieved” and undertook a trip to the U.S. 
to interest American capital in India, reversing his previous attitude toward U.S. investment (33).  
While such contradictory actions offered some indication of the unreliability of anything 
Nehru said, Time argued further that his neutrality was slanted toward communist nations and 
away from the U.S.. The 1951 story pointed out that Nehru condemned the 1950 North Korean 
attack on the Korean Republic – suggesting that he was not partial to communist governments—
but “then refused to condemn the far larger attack by Communist China,” indicating that he was 
unwilling to take sides against Communist countries (“Pandit’s Mind” 34). Even his writings, 
Time believed, showed a clear preference for Communist nations, given that he “objects more to 
Communist methods than to Communist ideas” and “admits a strong emotional attraction toward 
Communism and the Soviet Union” (33). The flip-side of his pro-communist bias was tepid 
support for the U.S., and Time noted that Nehru wrote of the American Revolution “with polite 
admiration,” but with “none of the enthusiasm he has lavished on the…Russian Revolutions” 
(33). In a further instance of India’s problematic neutrality, the article described how “the 
Korean war surprised Nehru into another paradoxical position” (33). He first supported the U.S., 
saying that her soldiers “who are fighting and dying in Korea certainly do not represent dollar 
imperialism,” but, “once MacArthur’s men were across the 38th parallel, Nehru became more and 
more neutral against the U.S” (33).  
“In the biggest moral challenge of his day, Moralist Nehru has declared his neutrality,” 
said Time, echoing John Foster Dulles’s view that neutrality was not only impossible, but 
immoral (“Pandit’s Mind” 34). By espousing Gandhian principles of nonviolence but dispatching 
troops to Kashmir, by preaching neutrality but appearing to favor one side over the other, and by 
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castigating the U.S.’s immorality but remaining blind to the immorality of his neutrality, Nehru 
had revealed his hypocrisy through his capacity for saying one thing and doing another. He had 
thus “dashed ...hopes” that India could be a potential ally who would “lead a non-Communist 
Asia into the Western camp” (31). Like his penchant for thinking over acting, Nehru’s paradoxes 
were more than just puzzling; Time suggested that they also raised suspicions about India’s 
deceitful intentions and capacity for betrayal in the Cold War. 
In December 1959, Time published an extensive cover story on India to mark President 
Eisenhower’s visit that month. India had just suffered an unpleasant shock in a series of military 
skirmishes with China and Sino-Indian relations were the most tense they had been in recent 
history. Eisenhower’s trip thus aimed, as the banner on the 1959 cover stated, to “unify friends 
and win neutrals” such as India to the U.S.’s cause in the Cold War. The cover showed 
pictorially the situation that Nehru faced politically: he had the red dragon of Communist China 
advancing over the Himalayas on one side, and the blue U.S. banner on the other, seeking to 
make friends and “win neutrals.” Perhaps in aid of this American mission of friendship, Time’s 
criticisms of “Paradoxical India” were much less strident here than in 1951. Instead, the article 
was marked by a desire to identify with India to the point of casting her paradoxes in a positive 
light. Time took pains to portray a prevailing “atmosphere of unparalleled goodwill” between the 
two nations who, although different in many ways, “now find themselves accenting what they 
have in common: they are the world’s two largest democracies. Both threw off British rule. In 
Gandhi and in Lincoln, each has a national hero whose qualities of charity, compassion and 
gentleness both nations revere” (“India: The Shade” 20).  
When speaking of “this land of paradox,” (“India: The Shade” 21) Time did, admittedly 
give in to some of the usual commentary about the country as a land of extremes. It was not only 
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hot there, but so hot that “it is as though the earth were dying of apoplexy” where “millions of 
Indian villagers lie gasping in their mud huts” only to be drowned “in surging floods” and 
“torrential downpours” (20).  Equally troubling was that “in the midst of poverty there are polo-
playing maharajahs who are among the world’s richest men” (21). Ever India’s synecdoche, 
Nehru was described as “a man [who] is as contradictory as India as a nation” (21). However, 
these descriptions lacked the tone of anger and suspicion of 1951. The 1959 article even 
attempted a positive view of India’s paradoxes by highlighting how, “next door to the…primitive 
wooden plow lies an India as modern as Pittsburgh” and how, “for all its look of the past, the 
ambitious young republic is forging ahead in atomic energy” (21). In contrast to earlier 
arguments that such paradoxes reflected India’s inconsistency and unreliability, Time suggested 
that India’s ability to encompass complexity showed an admirable capacity for progress amid 
adversity.  
Time’s arguments about “Paradoxical India” – particularly its emphasis on India’s 
capacity for betrayal— started out negative in 1951, became more moderate in 1959, and all but 
disappeared by 1962. In that final year of coverage, Time made just one reference to India’s 
contradictions. Despite the new rapprochement with India, Time reported that “Americans 
…were irritated by evidence that the Indian government still prefers equivocation to the plain 
truth” (“India: Never Again” 28). The point of contention was that Nehru’s administration had 
asked the Indian press “not to print photos showing the arrival of U.S. arms” and made “the 
twelve U.S. Air Force transport planes sent by Washington to ferry Indian troops…sound like 
leased aircraft flown by mercenaries” (28). India’s unwillingness to publicize her new allegiance 
with the U.S. suggested that she still valued her relations with communist nations, and as such, 
possessed divided loyalties. However, this incident was mentioned in a brief paragraph toward 
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the end of a six page article that made no other mention of Indian duplicity. India’s 
contradictions were irritating and still noticeable, but no longer worth the agony. 
As with “Thinker Nehru,” the theme of “Paradoxical India” started as a key concern in 
Time’s coverage of India but lost prominence —dare one say it— as time went by. One gets the 
impression that Time had figured India out. Nehru’s mind was no longer an enigma, and India’s 
paradoxes had ceased to be worrisome. This confidence accompanied the gradual decline of the 
“Thinker Nehru” and “Paradoxical India” themes, and the rise of the theme of U.S. vindication.  
U.S. Vindication 
The sense that the U.S. had taken the right approach pervaded Time’s coverage of India, 
becoming more evident with each issue.  Where Nehru was an ineffectual thinker, the U.S. was a 
pragmatic actor. Where Nehru was wily and hypocritical, the U.S. was dependable and 
consistent. Thus, as neutrality was proven unfeasible, the U.S.’s suspicion of it was justified. 
This theme was hinted at in Time’s earlier depictions of Nehru as a poor leader and of 
communist nations as unscrupulous aggressors, but became most clear in later descriptions of the 
U.S. as the righteous party in the Cold War. 
Unlike the later issues, the 1951 Time issue did not spend much time advocating the 
superiority of the Western camp in the Cold War. Instead, the theme of U.S. vindication was 
manifested indirectly in arguments seeking to discredit Nehru or to locate the source of his 
successes in the U.S.. Time cast a disparaging eye on Nehru’s grasp of world politics, pointing 
out that his view of the world was “based on the standard British Socialist reading of 19th 
Century economic history,” that “his understanding of 20th Century American capitalism [was] 
negligible,” and that he had just “a fair textbook knowledge” of American history (“Pandit’s 
Mind” 32). In an effort to claim the moral high ground for the U.S., Time commented that “it was 
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Western influences that made Nehru a nationalist,” commenting that “Garibaldi was his hero 
long before Gandhi was” (32). Nehru was slowly downgraded as the article progressed; he 
started off as “the Asian statesman” but ended as a “well-meaning intellectual,” an “accident of 
history,” and finally, nothing more than a “nominal spokesman” (34).  Thus, the West was home 
to the true leaders of the world, while Nehru was proclaimed “a disappointment” (31).  
By 1959, it was not just the U.S. who was disappointed in Nehru but Nehru himself, 
having begun to suspect the error in his judgment. He was under noticeably greater stress in the 
1959 cover, in which he was painted with his head straining at his collar and with the sharp 
creases in his shirt revealing the tension he faced. Where he was contemplative in 1951, he was 
in severe doubt by 1959. The cover showed that he had left the shelter of his residence and the 
severity of the situation had dawned upon him. The cover article reported that “the ruthlessness 
of Red China’s behavior made a wreckage of some cherished convictions” and that “the national 
disillusionment was so great that even Nehru took off his rose-colored glasses and looked hard at 
his giant neighbor to the north” (“India: The Shade” 20). As Nehru found himself at “one of 
those peak events in history when a plunge has to be taken in some direction” (20), the cover 
picture showed the red ridges of dragon China’s back, the grey ridges of the Himalayas and the 
fiery orange ridges below creating a triple set of peaks and plunges that illustrated his tumultuous 
situation.   
Nehru’s panicked expression on the 1959 cover was matched by the article’s tone of 
triumphant vindication, in which Time noted how India finally admitted they “were playing with 
fire in wooing the Chinese” (“India: The Shade” 20). The implication of course, was that the 
U.S. had been a worthy ally from the beginning, something which Nehru would have realized if 
he were a better leader.  Continuing the tale of Nehru’s decline begun in the 1951 issue, Time in 
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1959 declared that Nehru was “flat and stale” (21) and had “lost his once unshakeable hold on 
the nation’s intellectuals (23).  
The dimming of Nehru’s star was rendered bleaker by the rising communist presence in 
November 1962, when Time featured Nehru on its cover just a week after China concluded two 
victorious military offenses across its disputed border with India. The final cover was stark and 
bereft of symbols save one: Mao Tse-Tung looming in angry red tones over Nehru, who was 
shown with his head bowed and shoulders slumped in defeat. No longer the urgent statesman, he 
was drawn as a beaten opponent, unhappy to have been so wrong for so long. A banner in the top 
right corner drove the point home by announcing “India’s Lost Illusions.” The cover forced 
Nehru to concede defeat, reflecting a celebratory vindication not just over communism, but over 
Nehru’s resistance to the U.S..   
More so than the other articles, the 1962 cover story diminished Nehru’s status in order to 
claim ascendancy for the U.S., announcing that “Nehru’s power will be circumscribed from now 
on. His long years of unquestioned, absolute, personal rule are at an end” (“India: Never Again” 
27). Where Nehru used to be India’s biggest man, he was now “physically and mentally spent. 
His hair is snow-white and thinning, his skin greyish and his gaze abstracted” (27). Time gloated 
that “India’s catastrophic unreadiness for war stems directly from the policy of nonalignment” 
(25) which had “ceased to have any meaning” (28) and was “ending in disaster” (23). The article 
made much of Nehru’s “agony” and the shattering of the “morally arrogant pose from which he 
had endlessly lectured the West on the need for peaceful coexistence with Communism” (23). 
Nehru had been unseated and his policy of neutrality had tumbled after him.   
Having proclaimed victory in this sub-battle of the Cold War, the 1962 article focused, 
like its cover, on Nehru’s poor choice of allies. In particular, Time emphasized that Nehru’s 
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courtship of China was foolish because it had blinded him to the obvious wisdom of friendship 
with the U.S.. The article described how Nehru “no longer defended his old policies, denounced 
China as an ‘imperialist of the worst kind’ and at last thanked the U.S. and Britain by name for 
arms aid” (“India: Never Again” 24). The “at last” was telling; it hinted at the long-standing U.S. 
desire for recognition as a benefactor. In reporting how “frantic Indian officers…drove round to 
the U.S. embassy with…pleas for arms and supplies,” Time pointed out that the U.S. had finally 
been acknowledged as the righteous party in the Cold War, one who, unlike China, “moved 
swiftly and without recrimination to India’s defense” (24). This point was also mirrored in the 
layout of the cover story and the magazine’s choice of photographs to accompany the article. A 
1957 photograph of Nehru and Mao’s deputy Chou En-Lai was captioned “No more Hindi Chini 
bhai bhai” (a Hindi phrase which loosely translates to “Hindu-Chinese are brothers”),17 
reminding readers of India’s unwise friendships. The photograph was juxtaposed strategically 
against another whose caption spoke for itself: “U.S. military supplies being loaded at Calcutta: 
Discovering who one’s friends are” (27). 
Together, Time’s covers and articles crafted a narrative arc which traced the seemingly 
inevitable demise of India’s Cold War foreign policy, a perspective which aligned with the anti-
communist, pro-U.S. convictions of Time’s editor-in-chief. At the same time, this narrative 
endorsed and reaffirmed the U.S. government’s view of the correctness of its cause and the error 
of those who did not side with the U.S. against communism. Time’s coverage portrayed the 
U.S.’s unhappiness at India’s tolerance of China’s territorial incursions and her failure to respond 
forcefully to such belligerence. Eventually, the depictions of U.S. frustration give way to 
exultation. Nehru was compelled to admit that neutrality had proven impossible, allowing Time 
to paint a story in which the U.S. had been right all along. 
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Conclusion 
This rhetorical analysis of early perceptions of India as depicted by a prominent news 
outlet has revealed three arguments about India’s policy of Cold War neutrality. The first, 
“Thinker Nehru,” criticized India’s Prime Minister for his tendency to favor deliberation over 
deliberate action, a trait which suggested that his neutrality policy was flawed because it was the 
outcome of philosophical inertia rather than effective political leadership. The second theme, 
“Paradoxical India,” described discrepancies between Nehru’s words and deeds, such as between 
his supposed neutrality and his tilt toward Communist countries, or his advocacy of non-violence 
while approving Indian military action. This argument saw Nehru’s equivocations and his 
country’s ability to accommodate contradictions as signs of India’s capacity for deceit. Thus, 
neutrality was not just flawed, but false. Finally, the theme of “U.S. Vindication” showed how 
neutrality had failed by highlighting China’s aggression toward India, Nehru’s reluctant 
admittance of defeat, and his recognition of the need for U.S. assistance.  
Time’s arguments combined to form a narrative arc tracking the demise of Nehru’s 
neutrality policy while affirming the U.S. position in the Cold War and promoting the essential 
correctness of the U.S. administration’s stance. This narrative tells us several things about how 
the U.S. viewed itself as well as other countries during the Cold War —particularly those whose 
allegiance was expected but elusive— and how certain themes of the Cold War persist in the 
U.S.’s relations with India today. 
Embedded in the overlying arc is the story of the U.S. perception of India as the new 
nation picked her role on the international stage. Time’s castigation of Nehru’s mistaken 
friendship with China relayed the admonitory attitude of post-war America toward new 
democracies who failed to accept the U.S. as an ally. In doing so, the magazine echoed John F. 
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Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural address in which he said about former colonial nations: “We shall not 
always expect to find them supporting our view, but we shall always hope to find them strongly 
supporting their own freedom and to remember that, in the past, those who foolishly sought 
power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside (emphasis mine)” (192). The U.S. 
administration thus warned newly independent nations like India that in their drive to escape 
former colonial masters and new ‘U.S. imperialists’, they risked even greater enslavement by 
pursuing allegiances with the Soviet Union and China.18 
The belief in the value of alignment with the U.S. raised complicated questions about 
how to engage countries who did not subscribe to this belief. Instead of seeing the U.S. as the 
best candidate with which to seek a Cold War alliance, a 1956 Time article stated bitterly that 
“Nehru [was] not particularly a friend of the U.S., nor [did] he ask to be so measured” (“India: 
The Uncertain Bellwether” 17). The U.S.’s unhappiness with India’s neutrality was about more 
than defending democracy over communism. It also stemmed from a belief that nations like 
India, who charted courses away from the U.S., would fail because they had denied the 
superiority of the U.S. cause – they were doomed to end up inside the tiger because they had not 
flocked to the bald eagle.  
Time’s coverage revealed traits of U.S. foreign policy which continue to characterize the 
U.S.’s conduct in the twenty-first century: an insistence on either full allegiance from another 
country or complete enmity with it, and a tendency to personalize foreign policy by making a 
single public figure the focus of policy efforts. U.S. administrations have consistently viewed 
neutrality as a betrayal of universal ideals championed by the U.S.. Just as Cold War 
administrations saw neutrality as immoral, President George W. Bush declared famously in 2001 
that countries were either with or against the U.S. in deterring terrorism, once again denying the 
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validity of the middle path in global affairs. The criticism of India’s Cold War neutrality was 
ironic given that India’s primary reason for it –to avoid being pulled into wars of others’ 
making— was the same reason the U.S. passed its 1935 and 1939 Neutrality Acts: that the 
country wished to guard itself from being drawn into Europe’s political conflicts after being 
pressured to intervene in World War I. Hence, despite an earlier history of neutrality, the U.S. 
continues to view neutrality by other countries with suspicion. 
U.S. foreign policy, particularly when seeking to criticize or attack, also tends to take as 
its focus not so much the other party involved as its leader. Hence, the U.S.’s stance on India was 
often conflated with attitudes toward Nehru. To a degree, this makes sense, as leaders are the 
primary contact between nations and thus serve as a useful focus of foreign policy. Nehru was 
what Kenneth Burke referred to as the “noblest” synecdoche, in which an individual is treated as 
a microcosm of the larger universe that he represents (508). When Time magazine depicted 
Nehru on its covers and when the U.S. administration interacted with him, they were, to all 
intents and purposes, engaging India. However, as I argued earlier, U.S. relations with India were 
often influenced by the opinions incumbent administrations had of Nehru: if neutrality didn’t 
work, it was partly because Nehru was an impractical statesman, and if India was to be courted 
as an ally, it was partly because Nehru was so important to the survival of India and other 
democracies. Even beyond relations with India, the milestones of U.S foreign policy are easily 
read as a roll call of individuals who have earned the ire of the U.S.: Adolf Hitler, Fidel Castro, 
Kim Jung Il, Nikita Khrushchev, Mao Tse-Tung, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hugo Chavez, and 
Osama bin Laden. Thus, Time’s depictions of U.S.-India relations are a useful reminder that U.S. 
foreign policy has changed little from previous habits of eschewing neutrality by other nations 
and personalizing foreign relations.   
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It has been my intention to shed more light on this way of conceptualizing relationships 
with other nations through an examination of how a prominent U.S. media outlet reflected the 
U.S. government’s perception of India during the Cold War. The essay’s choice of India 
highlights the importance of expanding work on U.S. foreign policy to consider developing 
nations more closely, either by evaluating how the U.S. communicates with these nations or by 
placing greater emphasis on the discourses of countries other than traditional allies of the U.S.. 
Not only does this approach offer fresh ground for future rhetorical scholarship, but is necessary 
in a world where a country’s political future is determined ever more by its ability to 
communicate successfully with a wider swathe of nations than before.  
This analysis also drew on verbal and visual elements to excavate a series of arguments 
about another nation. Just as the messages of diplomacy are often encoded in visual forms –a 
statue of liberty, a photographed handshake, a row of flags outside the United Nations— so are 
the discourses of news reporting. Cover images like Time’s are important texts which condense 
the content of written articles into a single, enthymematic visual argument that draws on 
universal symbols such as the philosopher-thinker or ‘dragon China’ to make its case. This case 
study has shown how an examination of images and their interaction with words can enrich close 
textual studies. As Murray Edelman once observed, “politics is a series of pictures in the mind,” 
(5) and although pictures do not act alone, my aim has been to show how, in addition to verbal 
discourse, images can inform studies of political communication between nations.  
The world today presents a different picture than it did when Nehru stared out at U.S. 
viewers from the cover of Time. China, still the world’s largest communist regime, is now the 
U.S.’s second largest trading partner. India, still the world’s largest democracy, has at various 
points in the past 50 years, had communist governments hold power in the key states of Kerala 
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and West Bengal, but is a closer ally of the U.S. than ever before. India’s leadership of the Non-
Aligned Movement has been replaced by its membership in a new nexus of influence made up of 
the emergent B.R.I.C. (Brazil-Russia-India-China) countries. Yet, the manner in which U.S.-
India interactions are depicted in U.S. news media still displays anxieties of the Cold War.  
The theme of “Paradoxical India” has proven especially enduring. In the main, this theme 
manifests itself in the persistent tendency to portray India as a nation seeking to reconcile 
opposing dualities and divergent goals. In 2012, Foreign Policy described India as a nation of 
contrasts  by reporting that “India’s identity as an international donor is a downright confounding 
phenomenon” because it “disbursed over $1.5 billion in traditional foreign aid in 2011…even 
while it remained the world's largest recipient of multilateral assistance”(Mullen & Ganguly). In 
“India’s Deadly Shopping Spree,” the magazine recounted India’s latest military escalation while 
reminding readers that the country was one of the world’s largest contributors of UN 
peacekeeping troops. Similarly, the New York Times ran an article in May 2012 about how 
Indian leaders met with Iranian businessmen while hosting U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, who had just called on India to reduce trade with Iran (Yardley). The article called this 
“diplomatic choreography” conducted “seemingly in open defiance of Mrs Clinton’s hard line” 
(Yardley). According to these portrayals, India’s openness with Clinton was circumscribed by its 
closed door meetings with Iran, just as its foreign contributions were newsworthy because they 
provided a stark contrast to India’s poverty rate, and its donation of peacekeeping troops was 
significant only when set against the context of the nation’s military buildup.  Hence, India 
continues to be viewed and understood through a lens which emphasizes how one set of her 
actions is negated or thrown into notable relief by a counter action.  
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To an extent, the “Paradoxical India” theme has shifted to recognize India’s numerous 
political pressures rather than indict her ‘confusing’ or deceitful nature. Readers of the Times 
article on Iran and India would see from further reading that the U.S. administration realized 
India could not cut ties with Iran just to assuage the U.S.. In an evolution of “Paradoxical India,” 
the Times noted that “the Obama administration…recognizes that India has its own interests to 
defend” and that her leaders wish to maintain relations with Washington while sustaining the 
Indian economy through trade with Iran (Yardley). Perhaps such recognition signals a 
willingness to accept that other nations should chart their own paths as they see fit, regardless of 
whether that path leads toward the bald eagle, the tiger, Iran, or all of the above.  
However, such concessions occur in a climate that, despite stated aims of defining a new 
relationship, continues to show vestiges of Cold War preoccupations. Tellingly, the Times article 
was titled, “Indians Host Hillary Rodham Clinton While Also Wooing Iran,” (Yardley) an echo 
of Cold War reports of India wooing China and the Soviet Union while declaring neutrality. 
Even the Times’s new India Ink blog is subtitled “Notes on the World’s Largest Democracy,” 
evoking the longstanding U.S. fascination with India’s size and potential as a democratic ally.  
Thus, while Cold War news frames of India may have undergone adaptation, they remain, in 
several ways, rooted in the past. Such discourses require closer attention and alteration given that 
the U.S. is now firmly in a “post-American world” (Zakaria 2) in which it must cooperate more 
closely with India and former Cold War adversaries on multiple fronts. It is in this world that the 
images and discourses of the past gain new relevance for efforts to forge “defining partnerships 
of the 21st century” (“Remarks, 8 December 2010”). 
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Notes 
 
1. Ahimsa, the Hindi word for the avoidance of violence, was a central principle of 
Mahatma Gandhi’s freedom movement. 
2.  For a sampling of existing rhetorical work on India, see Yamabhai’s examination of 
Gandhi’s non-violence rhetoric, Merriam’s discussion of Gandhi’s non-verbal persuasion and 
Carlson’s application of Burke’s comic frame to Gandhi’s independence movement. 
3. The dragon was one of the most common symbols used to portray China to American 
audiences in this period. Between 1950 and 1970, one third of Time’s covers of China used the 
image of a dragon to denote China. Since then, China has been depicted by either an image of 
one of its leaders, or its flag’s yellow star. 
4. I do not wish to imply that visual rhetoric scholarship has ignored images of other 
countries. Hariman and Lucaites’s No Caption Needed looked at how photographs of Chinese 
protestors in Tiananmen Square and victims of napalm attacks in the Vietnam War how the 
American public talked about specific events such as the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and how 
these photographs were appropriated in evaluations of subsequent U.S. military involvements in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. I hope to contribute to such work in two ways: first, by studying how a 
series of texts creates a narrative of one country’s relationship with another, rather than 
examining an event captured in a single image. Second, while the visual element is important in 
this study, I wish to consider it alongside a close reading of textual elements. 
5. Chang found that in the 1950s, when the Communist party’s rise to power was freshest 
and the U.S.’s relations with China were at their most volatile, the President referred to China as 
“Red China” or the “Chinese Communist Regime,” indicating the illegitimacy of the Party’s rule 
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and the danger it posed. It was only during rapprochement in the 1970s that U.S. leaders referred 
to China as the “People’s Republic of China,” removing the earlier negative connotations. 
6. For details, see Kux on the “estranged democracies” of India and the U.S, and the 
complex relations between India, Britain and the U.S. at the onset of World War II. 
7. In 1922, there were just 2,600 Indians in the United States, 2,400 in 1940 and 
approximately 3,000 in 1950, attributable to the restrictive Immigration Act of 1917 which 
excluded all Indians as immigrants. It was only in 1946 that Congress restored to Indians the 
chance to enter the United States as immigrants and become naturalized citizens. However, this 
opportunity was restricted to 100 Indians a year, so interaction between the American public and 
Indians remained limited (Isaacs 283 & 285). 
8. Isaacs reported in Images of Asia that Mother India was “a sensation in the United 
States, in Great Britain and in India. It became the center of a storm that raged for half a dozen 
years, in the newspapers, the periodical press, and on the lecture platforms in all three countries,” 
and went through 27 editions (268-9). 
9. Time played heavily into such discourses.  In the late 1970s and 80s, postcolonial 
narratives resisting the  cultural hegemony of the West rose to prominence through works such 
as Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) and Gayathri Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988). 
Time, perceiving a slippage in U.S. power, published an editorial in 1981 titled “American 
Renewal,” touting the U.S.’s potential to rescue other nations from themselves. As Spurr noted, 
“at a moment of crisis in the postcolonial world, Time revive[d] a traditionally American rhetoric 
of self-affirmation” (119). 
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10. Before 1962, India appeared on Life’s covers as the setting for other events, such as 
the Dalai Lama’s escape to India (4 May1959) or Queen Elizabeth II’s visit (3 February 1961). 
The specific Life covers mentioned in this essay are available at the links below:  
The Dalai Lama’s escape (1959): http://www.originallifemagazines.com/LIFE-Magazine-May-4-
1959-P2673.aspx 
Queen Elizabeth II’s visit (1961): http://www.originallifemagazines.com/LIFE-Magazine-
February-3-1961-P1638.aspx 
Nehru’s funeral (1964): http://www.originallifemagazines.com/LIFE-Magazine-June-5-1964-
P1809.aspx  
11. The 1959 and 1962 cover issues were prefaced by letters from the publisher attesting 
to Time’s expertise on India. Time’s New Delhi foreign press corps, declared the letters, “time 
and again crossed footsteps with Nehru” and “traveled through more of India than most Indian 
journalists” (“A Letter,” 1959).  
12. In 2007, when studying why prominent U.S. news organizations parroted the Bush 
administration’s reasons for the Second Gulf War despite there being other, more plausible 
explanations, Bennett found that “the U.S. mainstream press has trouble with information that 
has not passed through some government source for its seal of approval” (4). For more, see 
Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston. 
13. Luce “not only edited but also censored,” practicing an “advocacy journalism” 
(Herzstein, xiv) to advance his “fervent faith in America’s God-ordained global mission in Asia” 
(1). He “used his vastly successful journalism as a kind of secular pulpit from which he preached 
the virtues of American engagement in Asia” (1). 
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14. An anonymous 1936 article in the Indian magazine Modern Review issued this severe 
judgment: “Men like Jawaharlal, with all their capacity for great and good work, are unsafe in a 
democracy. Jawahar has all the makings of a dictator in him – vast popularity, a strong will, 
ability, hardness, an intolerance for others and a certain contempt for the weak and insufficient. 
Is it not possible that Jawahar might fancy himself as a Caesar?” Years later, the writer was 
revealed as Nehru himself. From “India: The Uncertain Bellwether,” 18. 
 15. The covers came from Time issues published on May 7, 1951, December 4, 1959, and 
November 30, 1962. An image of each cover can be accessed at the links below: 
May 7, 1951: http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19510507,00.html 
December 4, 1959: http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19591214,00.html 
November 30, 1962: http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19621130,00.html 
16. While the three Time issues sometimes contained more than one article on India, most 
were incidental references. To make justifiable claims about the connection between the visual 
elements of the covers and the arguments in the magazine, I focused my analysis on the cover 
images and their corresponding article. I examined the covers following an approach outlined by 
Cara Finnegan in which I analyzed the composition of each image, focusing on content, color, 
and spatial organization. For more methodological details, see Finnegan. I analyzed the articles 
using a thematic content analysis in which I identified each article’s key arguments and 
compared these arguments to identify recurrent themes across the three articles. 
17. Ibid., 25. “Hindi Chini bhai bhai” was a cry of solidarity with China that used to be 
taken up in India’s streets prior to China’s incursions into Tibet and the Himalayas. 
18. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer of an earlier draft of this essay for this 
helpful insight. 
